The New York Times this morning drew my attention to a new definition of science coming out of the Kansas school system.
This document (pdf) outlines the changes. The new definition of science is straight out of postmodernism 101:
"2. Defines Science" as: "a systematic method of continuing investigation that uses observation, hypothesis testing, measurement, experimentation, logical argument and theory building to lead to more adequate explanations of natural phenomena." "
It's interesting that the document also notes that this definition excludes 'supernatural' explanations from the definition of science. However, this philosphical pacifier doesn't make a lot of difference to the argument--creation 'science' has moved on from Genesis 1; and creationists are now more commonly adherents of the theory of 'intelligent design'.
And while the document claims to exclude 'intelligent design' from the category of science, its hard to see how the above definition can uphold that claim--on the definition of science given above, intelligent design would be a valid alternative to the theory of evolution.
The document also states that the definition does not prohibit 'discussion' of intelligent design. And the changes go through great pains to ensure that the theory of evolution is presented as a theory that 'postulates', or 'seeks to explain' the world.
So here's the upshot: 'evolution' can be taught as 'just' a theory along with 'intelligent design' as an appropriate, or at least possible, meta theory which challenges the meta-theoretical implications of evolution-such as the concepts of variation and selection as just another variety of crass materialism. This is actually a neat solution (from the perspective of a fundametalist christian, that is) which avoids an outright debate between evolutionary theory and Genesis 1 at a level where observations and objectivity matter, but neatly shifts the whole package to a discussion about meta-theoretical implications where a straw man variety of the implications of evolutionary theory (such as 'man descends from the apes') can be contrasted against religiously inspired views without recourse to such things as material evidence.
I wonder whether this distinction between theories and meta-theories will actually filter through in the classrooms. It should be fairly clear that this step is a win for the religious right given that Christianity's problems with the theory of evolution have historically been focused more on its meta-theoretical implications than on the theory per se anyway.
The point is that 'intelligent design' doesn't stack up as a meta-theory either. To give credence to intelligent design would be to advance the empirically weaker meta-theory. By means of logical necessity, the theory of intelligent design is empirically empty. Why? Because it has no power to exclude certain ways the world could be; because all its explanations are by necessity post hoc, ad hoc arguments of the sort that the world was created to make it look 'as if' the theory of evolution, or any other cosmological theory were 'true' (and the word true has to be in scare quotes too for this to make sense).
A true postmodernist doesn't care about such distinctions--for the postmodernist such notions stem from a classical notion of philosophy of science which lost its last vestiges of validity somehwere in the mid-1960s, with the wider acceptance of Kuhn's notion of scientific paradigms. For the true postmodernist there are no a priori superior ways of 'making sense', just different ways. And in the end the 'way of making sense' that can muscle into power wins.
Friday, 18 November 2005
Monday, 14 November 2005
On the Scarcity of Scientists - Redux
Here are some first impressions after reading Chapter 1 'A Disturbing Mosaic' of Rising Above the Gathering Storm.
There is in my opinion quite a serious flaw in argument. In fact, I believe Chapter 1 is a large non sequitur. The analysis is based on Thomas L. Friedman’s view that in the twentieth century, due to the forces of globalization, the world will be 'flat'. What this means is that the forces of outsourcing and offshoring, coupled with ubiquitous networking, can distribute business processes over the world. The economic upshot of this scenario is one of increased competition but also cheaper production and services, as well as supporting political change. Overall, Friedman is positive about the forces of globalisation and believes that they will lead to a new era of prosperity.
The report states that the US is badly prepared for such a situation. The key passage of the first survey chapter reads:
"Friedman asks rhetorically whether his own country is proving its readiness by “investing in our future and preparing our children the way we need to for the race ahead”. The answer, not surprisingly, is no.
This report addresses the possibility that our lack of preparation will reduce the ability of the United States to compete in such a world." (page 1-3)
There is actually little more in the way of analysis to be found in the first chapter, the mosaic merely analyses a 'quiet crisis' in three related clusters. I might have more to say about these later, but think several comments can be made at this stage. My main comment is that in brief, the report selects the wrong metaphor to build the argument--it attempts to build the argument on a flat world, whereas it would have been more fruitful to build the argument on a spiked world.
The first comment is that in a flat world such as Friedman describes, national boundaries do not matter all that much; neither do concepts such as national security, or national competitive advantage. So it would seem that the use of Friedman’s view of globalisation discredits to a large extent the very point the report tries to make—that the US is simply not raising the talent it needs to compete in the brave new global world.
One might well argue that the forces of globalisation shift the nexus between rich and poor from a perspective of nations to--dare we say it--a perspective of class. It is somewhat surprising that the report fails to mention the key economic and social impact of globalisation (discussed for instance in the work of Zygmunt Bauman): geographically mobile capital and a geographically localized workforce (by and large). A macro trend might well be that we are moving from a world of national differences to a global world of class differences.
While this could lead to quite an interesting discussion of its own, I think the upshot for the report is the following. Were Friedmans picture the correct one, then as long as the world is not running of of scientists and engineers, it hardly matters whether one nation does.
The second comment is that the work of Friedman is hardly uncontroversial. I personally think that Friedman counts as one of the more naive writers on globalisation, and personally subscribe to the view that the world is becoming a place that is neither flat nor tilted, but spiked. What this means is that there will increasingly be clusters of specialisation in the world, and that the wealth of nations very much depends on the presence of the more lucrative clusters inside the national boundaries. There were some interesting graphs in the October issue of the Atlantic Monthly illustrating this concept quite well (but unfortunately not available on the web).
Of course, on the 'spiky' picture it is crucially important whether a nation has enough scientists and engineers inside the national boundaries, and indeed whether it has the capability to develop and sustain these clusters. This brings us back to a failed political experiment of the eighties, when it was quite popular to apply Michael Porter 's 'competitive advantage' theory to nations, and then 'pick winners' among its research programmes. That failed experiment is at least in large part responsible for the current misery.
But even on that picture, it is hardly a foregone conclusion that the Western world is running out of scientists and engineers. I personally would more believe an institution like the Rand corporation to get some of this right than the scientists themselves (The latter have too obvious an axe to grind). And the most recent reports (here and here) of the Rand corporation on the same issue form a much less convincing argument for the notion that we need to educate more scientists and engineers.
A fruitful area of research, provided the 'spiked' picture of the world is correct, is what creates and sustains specific spikes. The contention would be that this is a combination of the presence of specific skill sets, education, clever marketing and a lot of dumb luck.
There is in my opinion quite a serious flaw in argument. In fact, I believe Chapter 1 is a large non sequitur. The analysis is based on Thomas L. Friedman’s view that in the twentieth century, due to the forces of globalization, the world will be 'flat'. What this means is that the forces of outsourcing and offshoring, coupled with ubiquitous networking, can distribute business processes over the world. The economic upshot of this scenario is one of increased competition but also cheaper production and services, as well as supporting political change. Overall, Friedman is positive about the forces of globalisation and believes that they will lead to a new era of prosperity.
The report states that the US is badly prepared for such a situation. The key passage of the first survey chapter reads:
"Friedman asks rhetorically whether his own country is proving its readiness by “investing in our future and preparing our children the way we need to for the race ahead”. The answer, not surprisingly, is no.
This report addresses the possibility that our lack of preparation will reduce the ability of the United States to compete in such a world." (page 1-3)
There is actually little more in the way of analysis to be found in the first chapter, the mosaic merely analyses a 'quiet crisis' in three related clusters. I might have more to say about these later, but think several comments can be made at this stage. My main comment is that in brief, the report selects the wrong metaphor to build the argument--it attempts to build the argument on a flat world, whereas it would have been more fruitful to build the argument on a spiked world.
The first comment is that in a flat world such as Friedman describes, national boundaries do not matter all that much; neither do concepts such as national security, or national competitive advantage. So it would seem that the use of Friedman’s view of globalisation discredits to a large extent the very point the report tries to make—that the US is simply not raising the talent it needs to compete in the brave new global world.
One might well argue that the forces of globalisation shift the nexus between rich and poor from a perspective of nations to--dare we say it--a perspective of class. It is somewhat surprising that the report fails to mention the key economic and social impact of globalisation (discussed for instance in the work of Zygmunt Bauman): geographically mobile capital and a geographically localized workforce (by and large). A macro trend might well be that we are moving from a world of national differences to a global world of class differences.
While this could lead to quite an interesting discussion of its own, I think the upshot for the report is the following. Were Friedmans picture the correct one, then as long as the world is not running of of scientists and engineers, it hardly matters whether one nation does.
The second comment is that the work of Friedman is hardly uncontroversial. I personally think that Friedman counts as one of the more naive writers on globalisation, and personally subscribe to the view that the world is becoming a place that is neither flat nor tilted, but spiked. What this means is that there will increasingly be clusters of specialisation in the world, and that the wealth of nations very much depends on the presence of the more lucrative clusters inside the national boundaries. There were some interesting graphs in the October issue of the Atlantic Monthly illustrating this concept quite well (but unfortunately not available on the web).
Of course, on the 'spiky' picture it is crucially important whether a nation has enough scientists and engineers inside the national boundaries, and indeed whether it has the capability to develop and sustain these clusters. This brings us back to a failed political experiment of the eighties, when it was quite popular to apply Michael Porter 's 'competitive advantage' theory to nations, and then 'pick winners' among its research programmes. That failed experiment is at least in large part responsible for the current misery.
But even on that picture, it is hardly a foregone conclusion that the Western world is running out of scientists and engineers. I personally would more believe an institution like the Rand corporation to get some of this right than the scientists themselves (The latter have too obvious an axe to grind). And the most recent reports (here and here) of the Rand corporation on the same issue form a much less convincing argument for the notion that we need to educate more scientists and engineers.
A fruitful area of research, provided the 'spiked' picture of the world is correct, is what creates and sustains specific spikes. The contention would be that this is a combination of the presence of specific skill sets, education, clever marketing and a lot of dumb luck.
Wednesday, 9 November 2005
Does open source software development follow the scientific method?
One of the most exciting, and revolutionary, innovations in software development practice has to be the development of open source software. That open source works as a practical method of software development doesn't need too much debating: there are many successful open source products and companies. Products include the entire GNU/Linux operating system, the Apache web server, many security offerings such as snort and much more.
There are significant similarities between the ethos of the open source software movement and the ethos that most scientists would consciously or unconsciously agree to: a focus on openness, free sharing of information, the ability to reproduce and tinker.
This post focuses on the question whether the development methods of open source software bear a relation to those principles that philosophers of science claim to have identified in the development of scientific theories—and whether open source software development can shed some light on issues that might have been missed by philosophers of science in the past.
It would be attractive to see the success of the open source movement as another example of the success of the scientific method if it were not for the fact that beyond a superficial level there is no agreement in philosophy circles on what exactly constitutes the ‘scientific method’.
Broadly speaking, the consensus is divided in two camps. On the one hand there are philosophers who believe that there is some method or rationale behind scientific research, and that the aim of scientific research is to improve our theories, approach the truth, or make an inference to the best explanation. On the other hand there are philosophers, cultural scholars and a bundle of sociologists who argue that scientific knowledge is socially constituted.
A key observation is that the main point of debate between these camps is not the existence of rationality in scientific endeavor, but merely the direction of this rationality. ‘Traditional’ philosophers of science maintain that the goal of scientific rationality is improvement of scientific knowledge; the other camp believes that the goal of scientific rationality is social and professional advancement.
Philosophy of science has been stuck in this Gordian knot for the best part of the last 35 years, and it is here that a more detailed philosophical study of Open Source Software can make an impact. This contention is based on the three following premises:
There are significant similarities between the ethos of the open source software movement and the ethos that most scientists would consciously or unconsciously agree to: a focus on openness, free sharing of information, the ability to reproduce and tinker.
This post focuses on the question whether the development methods of open source software bear a relation to those principles that philosophers of science claim to have identified in the development of scientific theories—and whether open source software development can shed some light on issues that might have been missed by philosophers of science in the past.
It would be attractive to see the success of the open source movement as another example of the success of the scientific method if it were not for the fact that beyond a superficial level there is no agreement in philosophy circles on what exactly constitutes the ‘scientific method’.
Broadly speaking, the consensus is divided in two camps. On the one hand there are philosophers who believe that there is some method or rationale behind scientific research, and that the aim of scientific research is to improve our theories, approach the truth, or make an inference to the best explanation. On the other hand there are philosophers, cultural scholars and a bundle of sociologists who argue that scientific knowledge is socially constituted.
A key observation is that the main point of debate between these camps is not the existence of rationality in scientific endeavor, but merely the direction of this rationality. ‘Traditional’ philosophers of science maintain that the goal of scientific rationality is improvement of scientific knowledge; the other camp believes that the goal of scientific rationality is social and professional advancement.
Philosophy of science has been stuck in this Gordian knot for the best part of the last 35 years, and it is here that a more detailed philosophical study of Open Source Software can make an impact. This contention is based on the three following premises:
- Open Source Software follows an ethos very similar to that of scientific development, and has the same commitments to improvement of the end result, openness and sharing of information that has to this point characterized the Western scientific community
- Open Source Software is successful from a social perspective, with a significant adoption by businesses and end users.
- Open Source Software is successful in improving its end product – measured not only on the scale of social adoption, but also on the scale of improving the stability, security, and overall quality of the software.
Friday, 4 November 2005
On the scarcity of scientists
"Rising above the gathering storm" is the latest in a long series of publications that argue that America will soon run out of scientists and engineers. This sort of studies is commonly adopted quickly for the European markets too.
From my memory, studies like this go back to at least the late eighties, and maybe even earlier. The earliest study I'm aware of is an NSF study from the mid 1980's, which was bandied around aspiring PhD students pretty widely at the time with the prediction that on graduation in the early nineties, we'd all be guaranteed a job. We now know what happened to that.
The typical pattern of these studies is to link a modicum of political and economical analysis (in most cases of shockingly bad quality) to a foregone conclusion: we urgently need to educate 'xxx' more science and engineering graduates in order to stay economically competitive in a brave new world.
As with most lies, studies like these contain truths in reverse: the lie is that Western countries urgently need more science and engineering graduates--the truth is that science and engineering departments in the Western world are running out of students, fast, and urgenly need more students, graduate students and especially postdocs.
I'll probably be posting more about this particular study later, since I haven't read it in detail yet. I'm at this stage merely astounded that another one has seen the light of day.
From my memory, studies like this go back to at least the late eighties, and maybe even earlier. The earliest study I'm aware of is an NSF study from the mid 1980's, which was bandied around aspiring PhD students pretty widely at the time with the prediction that on graduation in the early nineties, we'd all be guaranteed a job. We now know what happened to that.
The typical pattern of these studies is to link a modicum of political and economical analysis (in most cases of shockingly bad quality) to a foregone conclusion: we urgently need to educate 'xxx' more science and engineering graduates in order to stay economically competitive in a brave new world.
As with most lies, studies like these contain truths in reverse: the lie is that Western countries urgently need more science and engineering graduates--the truth is that science and engineering departments in the Western world are running out of students, fast, and urgenly need more students, graduate students and especially postdocs.
I'll probably be posting more about this particular study later, since I haven't read it in detail yet. I'm at this stage merely astounded that another one has seen the light of day.
Wednesday, 2 November 2005
Past postmodernism
It is somehow amusing to see how the 'postmodern' philosophy is dying out; and it will be interesting to see what will replace it as a leading line of thought in academia. Here are some thoughts and speculations.
Postmodernism didn't become well known-or popular, take your pick-for its intellectual rigor, or its capability to say something useful about philosophy or science. At the time, it was the hip, progressive thing going. The main surprise at this stage is that postmodernism didn't leave a coherent body of political or critical thought.
In retrospect, I think one can fairly say that postmodernism was the main intellectual vehicle to allow a realignment of academia to a business oriented model. Postmodernism didn't emerge because the internal dynamic of intellectual progress somehow made it emerge--it was a market dynamic more than anything else which made it happen. Three things stand out in this market dynamic:
Postmodernism didn't become well known-or popular, take your pick-for its intellectual rigor, or its capability to say something useful about philosophy or science. At the time, it was the hip, progressive thing going. The main surprise at this stage is that postmodernism didn't leave a coherent body of political or critical thought.
In retrospect, I think one can fairly say that postmodernism was the main intellectual vehicle to allow a realignment of academia to a business oriented model. Postmodernism didn't emerge because the internal dynamic of intellectual progress somehow made it emerge--it was a market dynamic more than anything else which made it happen. Three things stand out in this market dynamic:
- Postmodernism made some academic careers at a time when a career crunch for academics was looming, and allowed academics to posture with the allure of film stars. No wonder that Hollywood was such a popular theme.
- Postmodernism convinced a wider public that Universities still had something relevant to say--something relevant that was moreover easy to understand, but which could be made to look fairly difficult with ease.
- Postmodernism was capable of attracting students to the sort of departments that might well otherwise have failed in the neo Darwinian universe of the modern university.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)